- Stockfolio mac cracked app serial number#
- Stockfolio mac cracked app archive#
- Stockfolio mac cracked app full#
- Stockfolio mac cracked app zip#
Like the first variant, it contains an embedded copy of Stockfolio.app version 1.4.13 with the malware author’s digital certificate. Using the digital certificate of the first sample, we were able to find a second variant (detected as ) that was uploaded to VirusTotal on June 2019.
Stockfolio mac cracked app full#
Furthermore, we suspect that the full malware routine uses the TOR network due to the presence of the unused address gmzera54l5qpa6lmonion. However, at the time of writing, we were unable to decrypt this file since the upload URL hxxps:///panel/uploadphp was inaccessible (according to VirusTotal, the domain was active from January to February 2019). We suspect the file appcode is a malware file that contains additional routines. Comparison of the code-signing information of the malicious app (top) and the legitimate Stockfolio app (bottom) Note that in the sample we analyzed, the decryption routine failed since the sample was not able to create ~/Library/Containers/.pass.įigure 7. If it fails to do so, it will delete the /tmp/appcode file and ~/Library/Containers/.pass. It then saves the decrypted file to /tmp/appcode. Using the contents of the ‘.pass’ file as the key, the malware variant will decrypt /private/var/tmp/appcode, which is encrypted using AES-256-CBC. app file then check if the file ~/Library/Containers/.pass exists. app file, executes it, then drops the following:
Stockfolio mac cracked app zip#
app file, which is the hidden file in the zip bundle that comes with Stockfoli.app The stock shell script will copy Stockfoli.app/Contents/Resources/appcode to /private/var/tmp/appcode. If a successful response is sent from the URL, it will write the response in another hidden file ~/Library/Containers/.pass
Stockfolio mac cracked app serial number#
It then uploads the file to hxxps:///panel/uploadphp using the collected username and machine serial number as identifiers. It then encodes the collected information using base64 encoding and saves the collected information in a hidden file: /tmp/.info. The plugin shell script collects the following information from the infected system: The main Mach-O executable will launch the following bundled shell scripts in the Resources directory: interface displayed when the malware app bundle is executed However, unbeknownst to the user, the malware variant is already performing its malicious routines in the background.įigure 4. When the app is executed, an actual trading app interface will appear on-screen. Comparison of the app bundle folder structure between the malware variant (top) and the legitimate app (version 1.5, bottom). The first suspicious component we found was an app bundle under the Resources directory, which seems to be a copy of the legitimate Stockfolio version 1.4.13 but with the malware author’s digital certificate.Ĭomparing it to the Resources directory of the current version (1.5) found on the Stockfolio website revealed a number of differences, as shown in the figure below.įigure 3. Note that the app bundle is missing the “o” at the end, whereas the legitimate app is called Stockfolio. The fake app presents itself as legitimate to trick users, but we found that it contained several malicious components.įigure 2.
Stockfolio mac cracked app archive#
The initial sample we analyzed was a zip archive file (detected as ) that contained an app bundle ( Stockfoli.app) and a hidden encrypted file (.app). The suspicious shell script which was flagged by our system To verify that the behavior was indeed malicious, we sourced the parent file using both our infrastructure and the aggregate website VirusTotal (which had the sample but lacked detections from other major security vendors at the time of writing).įigure 1. At first glance, it was challenging to directly identify its malicious behavior because the shell script references other files such as AppCode. We found the first sample (detected as ) while checking suspicious shell scripts that were flagged by our machine learning system. The first one contains a pair of shell scripts and connects to a remote site to decrypt its encrypted codes while the second sample, despite using a simpler routine involving a single shell script, actually incorporates a persistence mechanism.
We found two variants of the malware family.
We recently found and analyzed an example of such an app, which had a malicious malware variant that disguised itself as a legitimate Mac-based trading app called Stockfolio. However, their popularity has led to their abuse by cybercriminals who create fake trading apps as lures for unsuspecting victims to steal their personal data. Unlike in the pre-internet era, when trading in the stock or commodities market involved a phone call to a broker - a move which often meant additional fees for would-be traders - the rise of trading apps placed the ability to trade in the hands of ordinary users.
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